Annals of Health Law
Volume 3
Issue 1 1994

Article 13

1994

The Efficacy of the Medical Malpractice System: A
Canadian Perspective
Gerald B. Robertson
University of Alberta

Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons
Recommended Citation
Gerald B. Robertson The Efficacy of the Medical Malpractice System: A Canadian Perspective, 3 Annals Health L. 167 (1994).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol3/iss1/13

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Annals of Health Law by an authorized
administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

Robertson: The Efficacy of the Medical Malpractice System: A Canadian Perspe

The Efficacy of the Medical Malpractice
System: A Canadian Perspective*
Gerald B. Robertson**

INTRODUCTION

This article examines the medical malpractice system in Canada and attempts to determine if the system works. This article
provides a general assessment of the efficacy of the Canadian
system, particularly from the patient's perspective, highlights its
perceived problems, and reaches the following conclusions.
First, regardless of what one believes to be the underlying purpose of the medical malpractice system, the Canadian system is
not working. This is especially true from the perspective of the
patient. Second, the failure of the system is due to a number of
procedural and substantive reasons, but is linked primarily to
problems that patients have in accessing justice. These
problems are unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. Finally, although the system in Canada may be failing as a compensation scheme, Canadian law is beginning to have a
significant impact on the nature of the doctor-patient relationship, and in particular on the power base underlying that
relationship.
I.

THE EFFICACY OF THE SYSTEM

A number of difficulties arise when trying to assess the efficacy of the Canadian medical malpractice system. One problem
is the paucity of empirical data. There is fairly comprehensive
and reliable data on the frequency and severity of malpractice
claims in Canada published in the annual reports of the Cana* This article is based upon Professor Robertson's speech delivered at the Fourth
Annual Comparative Health Law Conference, "Medical Malpractice: A Comparative
Analysis," sponsored by Loyola University Chicago School of Law Institute for
Health Law in October of 1993.
** Gerald B. Robertson received his Bachelor of Laws from Edinburgh University and his Master of Laws from McGill University. He is a Professor of Law and the
Chair of the Health Law Institute at the University of Alberta in Edmonton, Alberta,
Canada, and a member of the Alberta Bar.

Published by LAW eCommons, 1994

1

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 3 [1994], Iss. 1, Art. 13

Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 3

dian Medical Protective Association ("C.M.P.A."). 1 However,
no data are available on the number of medical injuries occurring in Canada each year; hence, there is no measure of the percentage of injured patients who receive compensation. As is
discussed below, recent Canadian commentaries have tended to
rely on data from other countries in estimating this percentage.
Another difficulty stems from regional variation. Canadian
medical malpractice law is established almost exclusively at the
provincial level, resulting in some quite significant differences
across Canada, especially in matters of procedure and legislation. For example, as is discussed below, limitation statutes vary
considerably in some parts of Canada, as do methods of assessing damages in matters such as wrongful death actions. In addition, sociological and economic variations in different provinces
may have an impact on the frequency and severity of malpractice claims. These variations prevent a generalized analysis of
the efficacy of the medical malpractice "system" in Canada.
A third difficulty is that the perceived defects in the present
malpractice system vary depending on one's perspective.2 What
to some may appear to be a defect may seem to others to be a
strength. This difference in perspective is simply part of the
larger problem that there is no agreement as to the overall
objectives of the present malpractice system. In other words, it
is difficult to assess the efficacy of a system when its underlying
purpose is unclear. As Dewees and Trebilcock emphasize in
their comprehensive discussion of this theme, there are at least
three different evaluative frameworks that may be used in assessing the efficacy of the tort system in general and the medical
malpractice system in particular.3 These frameworks are based
on the normative goals of deterrence, corrective justice, and distributive justice. The first approach strives to minimize accident
and avoidance costs by ensuring an optimum level of incentives
and deterrents. Corrective justice, on the other hand, stresses
moral culpability and the need to compensate those who have
been injured through the fault of others. Finally, according to a
distributive justice theory, medical accidents are simply an inevitable consequence of the delivery of health care, and these inev1. The most recent is the CANADIAN MEDICAL
NINETY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT (1993) [hereinafter

PROTECTIVE ASSOCIATION,

C.M.P.A. REPORT].
2. Chester N. Mitchell & Shona McDiarmid, Medical Malpractice:A Challenge to
Alternative Dispute Resolution 3 CAN. J.L. & Soc'Y 227, 227 (1988).
3. Don Dewees & Michael Trebilcock, The Efficacy of the Tort System and Its
Alternatives: A Review of Empirical Evidence, 30 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 57 (1992).
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itable losses should be distributed among those who benefit
therefrom, health care providers and, ultimately, health care
consumers.
These different objectives are not wholly discrete nor are they
entirely incompatible with each other. Indeed, achieving these
objectives depends in large measure on a number of common
factors, perhaps the most important of which is that those who
are injured as a result of medical malpractice should have reasonable access to the justice system. This clear denial of access
to justice, which represents a significant defect in the system,
proves that the present malpractice system in Canada can be
seen as a failure, regardless of what one accepts as its underlying
purpose.
A.

Access to Justice

According to the most recent annual report of the C.M.P.A.,4
1,097 new claims were initiated against its members in 1992.- In
the same year, 306 claims were settled and 25 others resulted in
a trial judgment in favour of the plaintiff. The amount of total
damages paid out by the C.M.P.A. during 1992 was approximately $41 million (Can.), with legal costs of approximately $33
million (Can.). 6
As noted above, no reliable data are available on the number
of Canadians who suffer injury through medical negligence but
receive no compensation. This issue was discussed in a report to
the Conference of Deputy Ministers of Health entitled Liability
and Compensation in Health Care (the "PrichardReport") from
the Federal/Provincial/Territorial Review on Liability and Compensation Issues in Health Care (the "Prichard Review"). 7 The
Prichard Review, which was established in 1987 and chaired by
J. Robert S. Prichard, was given a mandate to
(1) examine and report on the issues relating to liability and
compensation matters associated with health care delivered by
professionals, institutions, voluntary organizations, and the
Canadian Blood Supply System, (2) advise on possible legal
4.
5.
sents
6.
7.

C.M.P.A. REPORT, supra note 1, at 18.
The C.M.P.A. had a membership of 55,189 physicians in 1992. Id. This repreapproximately 96 percent of all physicians practising in Canada.
Id. at 18, 31.
LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION IN HEALTH CARE: A REPORT TO THE CON-

FERENCE OF DEPUTY MINISTERS OF HEALTH OF THE FEDERALIPROVINCIAL/TERRITORIAL REVIEW ON LIABILITY & COMPENSATION ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE (1990)
[hereinafter PRICHARD REPORT].
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reforms designed to ameliorate the cost of liability claims on
the Canadian public health care system, and (3) advise on the
possibility of alternatives to litigation for persons disabled following an injury that occurred while they received medical
attention.8
One of the Review's principal findings was that of all patients
who suffered injury as a result of medical negligence, fewer than
ten percent received any compensation from the tort system. 9
Because of the lack of Canadian data, the Prichard Review
based this conclusion on data from other countries, in particular
the United States and Sweden. 10 More recent studies from the
United States, in particular, the Harvard Medical Practice
Study, indicate that the percentage of individuals suffering a
negligently caused medical injury who receive compensation is
much smaller than ten percent, perhaps as low as two percent."
Whatever the exact figure may be, it is beyond doubt that "there
is a huge gap between negligent adverse events and claims."' 2
Nor is there any compelling reason to believe that data from the
United States do not reflect the situation in Canada.' 3 Thus, in
the words of Mitchell and McDiarmid, "[i]nventing a malpractice litigation crisis also obscures the real problem, which is access to justice for injured medical patients ....

[T]he actual

injured by
crisis is that at least ninety-five percent of persons
14
medical malpractice receive no compensation.'
B. Reasons for Denial of Access: ProceduralIssues
The reasons why so many medical accident victims do not receive compensation are varied and complex.' 5 An economic
barrier stems from the fact that in 1978, the Supreme Court of
Canada placed a cap of $100,000 (Can.), which adjusted for inflation is now approximately $220,000 (Can.), on nonpecuniary
damages for items such as pain and suffering, loss of amenities,
8.
9.

Id. at 35.
Id. at 5.

10. Id., app. A at 98-103.
11. See Troyen A. Brennan, An Empirical Analysis of Accidents and Accident
Law: The Case of Medical Malpractice Law, 36 ST. Louis U. L.J. 823, 847 (1992);
PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION (1993).

12.

Brennan, supra note 11, at 848.

13.

Indeed, because the universal health care system in Canada covers most of the

health care costs associated with the patient's injuries, there is perhaps even less motivation for Canadians to commence malpractice litigation.
14. Mitchell & McDiarmid, supra note 2, at 229.
15. See PRICHARD REPORT, supra note 7, app. A at 103-04.
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and loss of expectation of life. 16 One significant factor is undoubtedly the expense involved in this type of litigation.
Though all Canadian provinces, with the exception of Ontario,
permit contingency fee arrangements, this is of little comfort to
potential plaintiffs whose claims are relatively modest and are
unlikely to be of interest to a lawyer on a contingency basis. As
the Prichard Report notes, legal counsel routinely discourage
claims involving predicted damages of less than $100,000
(Can.).' 7 Moreover, even if the claim is taken on a contingency
basis, the client still faces the prospect of having to pay part of
the defendant's legal costs if the claim is dismissed, since in Canada (unlike the United States) costs are normally awarded
against the unsuccessful party. Thus, there is a significant financial risk involved in pursuing a medical malpractice claim8 and,
for many, this risk represents an insurmountable barrier.'
Another impediment relates to limitation periods (analogous
to statutes of limitations in the United States). In most Canadian provinces the limitation period in personal injury claims is
two years. However, some provinces have a much shorter limitation period for medical malpractice claims, usually one year. 19
Indeed, in Saskatchewan the limitation period for claims against
hospitals is only three months.20 In most provinces, the limitation period in malpractice claims begins to run on the date on
which the professional services terminate or the date on which
the patient is discharged from the hospital, rather than from the
date on which the cause of action arose.2 ' Courts have tended
to construe this provision fairly rigidly. For example, courts
have held that this limitation period, unique to malpractice actions, applies whether the action is framed in negligence, con16.

Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alta. Ltd., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229.

17. PRICHARD REPORT, supra note 7, app. A at 104.
18. See Mitchell & McDiarmid, supra note 2, at 229-30.
19. This is true of Alberta, Ontario, Prince Edward Island, and Saskatchewan. See
Limitation of Actions Act, R.S.A., ch. L-15, §§ 55(a), 56 (1980); Health Disciplines
Act, R.S.O., ch. H.4, § 17 (1990); Hospitals Act, R.S.P.E.I., ch. H-10, § 13 (1988); The
Medical Profession Act 1981, 1980-81 S.S., ch. M-10.1, § 72.
20. The Hospital Standards Act, R.S.S., ch. H-10, § 15 (1978).
21. This is true of Alberta, Manitoba, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward
Island, and Saskatchewan. See Limitation of Actions Act, R.S.A., ch. L-15, § 55(a)
(1980); The Medical Act, R.S.M., ch. M-90, § 61 (1987); Medical Act, R.S.N., ch. M-4,
§ 25 (1990); Limitation of Actions Act, R.S.N.S., ch. 258, § 2(1)(d) (1989); Hospitals
Act, R.S.P.E.I., ch. H-10, § 13 (1988); The Medical Profession Act 1981, 1980-81 S.S.,
ch. M-10.1, § 72.
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tract,2 2 or battery. 23 A court 24 also held that the special
25
protection that these statutes give health care professionals
does not violate the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.26
Given a series of recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions
regarding the discovery rule, the tying of the limitation period to
the termination of professional services rather than to the accrual of the cause of action has a most significant effect. The
Supreme Court of Canada held that, for purposes of the limitation statutes, a cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff
discovers or with reasonable diligence should have discovered
the material facts upon which the action is based. However,
one provincial appellate court held that this discovery rule does
not apply where the running of the limitation period is tied to
the termination of professional services rather than to the accrual of the cause of action.28 According to this decision, the
limitation period starts to run as soon as the physician's services
terminate, regardless of whether the patient knows the material
facts, including the fact of injury, upon which the cause of action
is based. Thus, in the words of Madam Justice Wilson of the
Supreme Court of Canada, we have "the injustice of a law which
statute-bars a claim before the plaintiff is even aware of its
'29
existence.
22. Fishman v. Waters, 4 D.L.R.4th 760 (Man. C.A. 1983); Letiec v. Rowe, 130
D.L.R.3d 379 (Nfld. C.A. 1981); Sobon v. Kosloski, 46 Sask. R. 172 (Q.B. 1986).
23. Strachan v. Simpson, [1979] 5 W.W.R. 315 (B.C.S.C.); Hadley v. Allore, 35
C.C.L.T. 204 (Ont. H.C. 1985), aff'd, 43 C.C.L.T. 106 (Ont. C.A. 1988); Vincent v.
Hall, 49 O.R.2d 701 (H.C. 1985), aff'd, (Ont. C.A. 1987); McBain v. Laurentian
Hosp., 35 C.P.C. 292 (Ont. H.C. 1982).
24. Brochner v. MacDonald, 68 Alta. L.R.2d 191 (C.A. 1989).
25. Note, however, that the special limitation period may be detrimental to health
care professionals by forcing plaintiffs to commence their action at an early date, perhaps before a true assessment of the merits of the case can be made. This may also
encourage a "shotgun" approach to the selection of potential defendants. See PRICHARD REPORT, supra note 7, at 20, app. A at 197.
26. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms).
27. M.(K.) v. M.(H.), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 6; Central Trust Co. v. Rafuse, [1986] 2
S.C.R. 147; City of Kamloops v. Nielsen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 2.
28. Fehr v. Jacob, [1993] 5 W.W.R. 1 (Man. C.A.). See also J.(A.) v. Cairnie Estate, [1993] 6 W.W.R. 305 (Man. C.A.); Scott v. Birdsell, 143 A.R. 254 (Q.B. 1993).
For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Richard W. Bauman, The Discoverability Principle:A Time Bomb in Alberta Limitations Law, 1 HEALTH L.J. 65 (1993);
Gerald Robertson, Fraudulent Concealment and the Duty to Disclose Medical Mistakes, 25 ALTA. L. REV. 215 (1987); Gerald Robertson, Scott v. Birdsell: Limitation
Periods in Medical Malpractice Cases, 32 ALTA. L. REV. 181 (1994).
29. City of Kamloops, [1984] 2 S.C.R. at 40.
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C. Reasons for Denial to Access: Substantive Issues
In addition to the procedural obstacles relating to access to
justice, there are other reasons connected with the substantive
law that exacerbate the difficulty plaintiffs have in obtaining
compensation by means of a medical malpractice claim.3 ° The
standard of care traditionally applied in malpractice cases is
"that degree of care and skill which could reasonably be expected of a normal, prudent practitioner of the same experience
and standing. ' 31 In conjunction with this test, legal doctrines
such as accepted medical practice, error in clinical judgment,
and "two schools of thought" have given health care practitioners a considerable degree of protection. 32 Recent case law indicates that these legal doctrines continue to have a significant
impact on the outcome of medical malpractice litigation in Canada, with numerous cases being dismissed on the grounds that
the defendant either acted in accordance with generally approved practice or committed only an excusable error of clinical
judgment.3 3 Perhaps this is why the majority of Canadian malpractice claims that go to trial are decided in favour of the defendant. For example, in 1991, physicians succeeded in fortyseven of the sixty-one cases that reached trial; in 1992, fortyeight of seventy-three cases were decided in the physician's
favour.3 4

However, the Supreme Court of Canada has handed down a
number of decisions in the past few years that may eventually
have a significant impact in the medical malpractice field.3 5 For
6 the Supreme Court expressed the
example, in Snell v. FarrelP
30. These factors are discussed in detail in Gerald Robertson, Reform of the Law
of Medical Liability: The Position in the Common Law Jurisdictions of Canada, in

1990 INTERNATIONAL
173 (H. Patrick Glenn ed., 1992).

CONTEMPORARY LAW: CANADIAN REPORTS TO THE

OF COMPARATIVE LAW

31.
32.

Crits v. Sylvester, [19561 O.R. 132, 143 (C.A.), aff'd, [1956] S.C.R. 991.
See generally ELLEN 1. PICARD, LEGAL LIABILITY OF DOCTORS AND Hospi-

TALS IN CANADA

33.

CONGRESS

153-78, 229-43 (2d ed. 1984).

See Robertson, supra note 30, at 174-78.

34. C.M.P.A. REPORT, supra note 1, at 18. In 1991, 493 cases were dismissed or
disconinuted prior to trial, and 236 cases were settled; in 1992, 496 cases were dismissed or discontinued prior to trial, and 306 cases were settled. Id.
35. This is part of a larger trend that has seen the Supreme Court of Canada
render many significant decisions in the area of tort law in the past three years, and
which appears to represent a resurgence of interest in tort law on the part of Canada's
highest court. See Lewis N. Klar, The Supreme Court of Canadaand the Law of Torts,
in LEGAL EDUCATION SOCIETY OF ALBERTA, UPDATE '92: WHAT'S NEW IN TORT
LAW 1 (1993).
36. [1990] 2 S.C.R. 311.
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opinion that trial judges in medical malpractice cases frequently
apply too high a standard of proof in relation to causation, almost to the point of requiring scientific certainty. In urging a
less rigid approach, Justice Sopinka stressed that causation is
"essentially a practical question of fact which can best be answered by ordinary common sense rather than abstract metaphysical theory. '37 The decision in Snell v. Farrell is already
having an impact in the lower courts, where it has assisted plain38
tiffs in proving causation in medical malpractice cases.
Likewise, in Mclnerney v. MacDonald39 the Supreme Court
greatly expanded patients' rights of access to their own health
care records, basing its decision on the fiduciary nature of the
doctor-patient relationship. 0 Most recently the Court held that
the doctrine of informed consent requires the physician not only
to disclose material information to the patient (judged by the
"prudent patient" standard), 41 but also to take reasonable steps
to ensure that the patient understands this information.42 These
recent decisions may well portend an expansion in liability of
the medical profession in the not too distant future.
II.

SHIFTING THE POWER BASE OF THE DOCTOR-PATIENT
RELATIONSHIP

Another discernible trend in Canadian medical malpractice
law relates to the nature of the doctor-patient relationship, and
in particular the power base underlying that relationship. In this
regard it is useful to compare Canada's approach with the ap37. Id. at 328 (quoting Lord Salmon in Alphacell Ltd. v. Woodward, .[1972] 2 All
E.R. 475, 490 (H.L.)).
38. See, e.g., Crick v. Mohan, 142 A.R. 281 (Q.B. 1993); Cherry v. Borsman, 94
D.L.R.4th 487 (B.C.C.A. 1992); Wilson v. MacKay, [1993] B.C.J. No. 739 (S.C.); Watt
v. Gillanders, [1992] B.C.J. No. 1117 (S.C.); Levitt v. Carr, [1992] 4 W.W.R. 160
(B.C.C.A.), appeal dismissed, [1992] 6 W.W.R. lviii (S.C.C.); Lankenau v. Dutton,
[1991] 5 W.W.R. 71 (B.C.C.A.), appeal dismissed, [1991] 6 W.W.R. lxvii (S.C.C.);
Brewer v. Wade, [1992] N.B.J. No. 741 (Q.B.); Crandell-Stroud v. Adams, [1993]
Nfld.J. No. 224 (S.C.); Briffett v. Gander & Dist. Hosp., 326 A.P.R. 271 (Nfld. S.C.
1992); Mahoney v. Jarvis, [1993] O.J. No. 248 (Gen. Div.); Skinner v. Royal Victoria
Hosp., [1993] O.J. No. 1054 (Gen. Div.); Kenyeres v. Cullimore, [1992] O.J. No. 540
(Gen. Div.); Mann v. Jugdeo, [1993] 4 W.W.R. 760 (Sask. Q.B.).
39. [1992] 2 S.C.R. 138.
40. The fiduciary nature of the relationship was also emphasized by some of the
Justices in Norberg v. Wynrib, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 224, in awarding damages against a
doctor in connection with a "sex-for-drugs" arrangement which he had with a patient.
41. The Supreme Court first established this principle in Reibl v. Hughes, [1980] 2
S.C.R. 880.
42. Ciarlariello v. Schacter, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 119; see also, Joan Gilmour, An Overview of Medical Malpractice in Canada, 3 ANNALS HEALTH L. 179, 191 (1994).
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proach adopted in recent years by English courts, most notably
the House of Lords. 3 In England, as in Canada, the concept of
"generally approved practice" has figured prominently in determining the standard of care to be expected of medical practitioners. English courts routinely apply what they refer to as the
"Bolam test," 44 which dictates that a physician "is not guilty of
negligence if [he or she] has acted in accordance with a practice
accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical [practitioners] skilled in that particular art. '45 As noted above, this approach gives the medical profession considerable protection
from civil liability. However, it also has the potential to do
much more than this. The Bolam test reflects and reinforces the
power of the medical community in general and the power of
the individual practitioner within the doctor-patient relationship. If courts extend this test beyond purely malpractice issues
into areas of health care decision making in general, the effect
will be to significantly expand the power and control of the medical profession over issues that are by no means entirely clinical
or scientific in nature.
This appears to be happening in England, where courts are
using the Bolam test to analyze and resolve critical issues involving control over health care decision making. For example, in
Re F,46 the House of Lords held that medical treatment may be
given to a mentally incompetent patient without anyone's consent, regardless of whether the situation is one of emergency, so
long as the treatment is in the patient's best interests. In determining what is in the patient's best interests, the court focussed
on whether the physician acted reasonably in deciding to administer the treatment; the reasonableness was judged by the traditional standard of the reasonable physician in similar
circumstances. Thus, if the patient is mentally incompetent, decisions regarding the initiation, continuation, and withdrawal of
treatment lie exclusively within the professional judgment of the
physician. Perhaps not surprisingly, the decision in Re F was

43. See also John Hodgson, Medical Malpractice: An Overview of the English System, 3 ANNALS HEALTH L. 225, 228 (1994).

44. This takes its name from the leading decision in Bolam v. Friern Hosp. Management Comm., [1957] 2 All E.R. 118 (Q.B.).
45. Id. at 122.
46. [1990] 2 A.C. 1 (H.L.).
Published by LAW eCommons, 1994
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described by one English commentator as "medical paternalism
run amok."47
In a similar vein, the House of Lords recently held that the
question of whether artificial nutrition and hydration can be
withdrawn from a patient in a persistent vegetative state is primarily a medical matter to be determined by reference to prevailing medical opinion.48 Likewise, in the context of informed
consent, England's highest court rejected the "prudent patient"
standard of disclosure, preferring instead to view pre-treatment
disclosure of risks and other material information as a matter of
clinical judgment to be measured by the traditional standard of
the reasonable physician.49 The English trend of enhancing physicians' control over medical decision making is evident in sev50
eral other areas, including access to contraceptives by minors
and sterilization of mentally disabled individuals. 1
The position taken by the English courts contrasts starkly with
the approach adopted by Canadian courts in recent years. The
Supreme Court of Canada, as well as provincial appellate courts,
have made a number of key decisions that significantly affect the
balance of power within the doctor-patient relationship. For example, although the Supreme Court's adoption of the "prudent52
patient" test for disclosure in the context of informed consent
has not had a major effect on the actual outcome of malpractice
cases against physicians, 53 it signals a trend of patient autonomy
prevailing over medical paternalism and has the potential to af47.

Michael A. Jones, Justifying Medical Treatment Without Consent, 5 PROF.
178, 181 (1989). For another criticism, see Phil Fennell, Inscribing Paternalism
in the Law: Consent to Treatment and Mental Disorder, 17 J.L. & Soc'Y 29 (1990);
M.J. Gunn, Treatment and Mental Handicap, 16 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 242 (1987); ALNEGL.

BERTA LAW REFORM INSTITUTE, ADVANCE DIRECTIVES AND SUBSTITUTE DECISIONMAKING IN PERSONAL HEALTH CARE, Report for Discussion No. 11, at 19-20 (1991).

48.

Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland, [1993] 1 All E.R. 821 (H.L.).

49.

Sidaway v. Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hosp., [1985] A.C. 871

(H.L.). See the critical discussion in Harvey Teff, Consent to Medical Procedures:
Paternalism,Self-Determination or TherapeuticAlliance, 101 LAW Q. REV. 432 (1985).
50. Gillick v. West Norfolk & Wisbech Area Health Auth., [1986] A.C. 112 (H.L.).
For a detailed discussion of this case see IAN KENNEDY, TREAT ME RIGHT: ESSAYS IN
MEDICAL LAW AND ETHICS 52, 61 (1988).
51. See Re F, [1990] 2 A.C. 1.
52. Reibl v. Hughes, [19801 2 S.C.R. 880.
53. Plaintiffs fail in approximately eighty-two percent of cases in which they allege
a lack of informed consent, primarily because of their inability to prove causationthat is, they are unable to show that a reasonable patient in the plaintiff's position
would have declined the treatment if proper disclosure of the risks had been made.

See Gerald Robertson, Informed Consent Ten Years Later: The Impact of Reibl v.
Hughes, 70 CAN. B. REV. 423, 428 (1991).
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fect profoundly the balance of power within the doctor-patient
relationship.5 4 Also, Canadian courts have recognized that patients have a constitutionally protected fundamental right to
make their own health care decisions, including to refuse life-

saving treatment. Likewise, other decisions have altered this
balance of power by expanding patients' rights to access their
own health care records 5 6 prohibiting nontherapeutic steriliza-

tion of mentally disabled individuals, 57 and recognizing the validity of advance directives even in the absence of enabling
legislation.58 It remains to be seen whether this theme will also
be evident in other areas of medical decision making that have

yet to be addressed by Canadian courts, such as the allocation of
resources 59 and issues of medical futility.
CONCLUSION

This article outlines some of the defects in the Canadian medical malpractice system, especially those that prevent patients

from accessing justice. It seems unlikely that these defects will
be remedied in the near future. The Prichard Review did make
a number of recommendations that sought to address the problem of access, such as revising the limitations statutes 60 and

broadening the availability of legal aid for malpractice plaintiffs.
The Prichard Review also recommended that a no-fault com54.

See JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984); Mar-

garet A. Somerville, Informed Consent: An Introductory Overview, in LAW
COMMISSION

REFORM
OF VICTORIA, INFORMED CONSENT SYMPOSIA 2 (1986); Robertson,

supra note 53, at 439-40.
55. Rodriguez v. Attorney Gen. of Canada, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519; Ciarlariello v.
Schacter, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 119; Reibl v. Hughes, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 880; Fleming v. Reid,
82 D.L.R.4th 298 (Ont. C.A. 1991); Malette v. Shulman, 67 D.L.R.4th 321 (Ont. C.A.
1990); Nancy B. v. H6tel-Dieu de Qu6bec, 86 D.L.R.4th 385 (Que. Super. Ct. 1992).
In Fleming the Ontario Court of Appeal held that certain provisions of the Mental
Health Act, R.S.O., ch. 262 (1980) (current version at R.S.O., ch. M-7 (1990)) were
contrary to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, because they infringed the
patient's right to refuse psychiatric treatment.
56. McInerney v. MacDonald, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 138.
57. Eve v. Mrs. E., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 388. For a discussion of the various reactions to
this decision, see Gerald Robertson, Sterilization, Mental Disability,and Re Eve: Affirmative Discrimination?,in DISCRIMINATION IN THE LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 447 (Walter S. Tarnopolsky et al. eds., 1993).

58.
59.

Fleming v. Reid, 82 D.L.R.4th 298; Malette v. Shulman, 67 D.L.R.4th 321.
See the interesting discussion in Robert Lee, Doctors as Allocators: The Bald

Facts, in LAW, HEALTH & MEDICAL REGULATION 169, 180-87 (Sally Wheeler &

Shaun McVeigh eds., 1992).
60. The recommendation was for a six year limitation period, running from the
date of discovery, subject to a maximum of ten years from the date when the services
were rendered. PRICHARD REPORT, supra note 7, at 21.
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pensation scheme be introduced as an alternative to the tort system for those suffering "significant avoidable health care
injuries," which system would require the patient to elect between accepting no-fault compensation or pursuing a negligence
action. 61 However, in the three years since the Prichard Review
issued its report, there has been no indication of any interest by
the provincial governments to implement the recommendations
contained in the report.
At the same time, however, it is likely that there will continue
to be an escalation in the two factors that influenced the commissioning of the Prichard Review: 1) government concern over
the cost of the present malpractice system and its possible negative impact on the quality of health care in Canada, and 2) the
medical profession's dissatisfaction with the effect of the present
system on its members. The recent trend in Canadian case law
toward disempowering physicians in matters of medical decision
making will certainly enhance such feelings of dissatisfaction. In
time, these two factors may well force Canadian governments to
give serious consideration to implementing some of the recommendations of the Prichard Review.

61. Id. at 28-30. For a discussion of the Prichard Review's recommendations see
Bernard M. Dickens, Implications of Health Professionals' Legal Liability, 1 HEALTH
L.J. 1 (1992).
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